Prīti is not under the control of the devotee

Śrī Jīva Goswami summarizes the definition of prīti in the Prīti Sandarbha Anuccheda 78.2 with a beautiful metaphor. For this, he employs gadya-kāvya or prose poetry consisting of one very long sentence with many compound words. I will present Babaji’s translation of this passage in a future article. Here, I examine an important, related concept that needs to be examined first.

The passage starts with the following statement:

atha śrī-bhagavat-prīti-lakṣaṇa-vākyānāṁ niṣkarṣaḥ—

Now, the essence of all the statements defining the nature of prīti for Śrī Bhagavān is poetically expressed in the following words [employing the metaphor of the exclusive loving disposition of a beautiful, exquisitely adorned, exceedingly virtuous, and supremely opulent wife toward her uniquely qualified husband]

The long sentence consists of only three types of words: one verb, many qualifiers of prīti which is the subject of the sentence and the object of prīti, Bhagavān, along with many qualifiers which are all in the locative case. The verb is virājate – shines forth majestically. Thus, the overall syntax is:

bhagavati pritir virājate – prīti for Bhagavān shines forth majestically.

Why the object of prīti is in the locative case

I will now examine the logic for why the object of prīti is in the locative case or saptami vibhakti. Objects of a verb are supposed to be in the accusative case. That word in a sentence is put in the locative case which acts as a support of the action signified by the verb.

To see all this, consider the sentence —

rāmaḥ vanam gacchati – Rāma went to the forest.

Here, the word vanam is in accusative case, and not in locative case. One could construct a sentence with vana in the locative case as follows:

rāmaḥ vane sītām anveṣitavān – Rāma searched for Sītā in the forest.

Here, the action of searching took place in the forest, which acts as its support, and hence is in the locative case (vane). The object of the action of search is Sītā, and she is in the accusative case.

Now, love is between two individuals, such that there is a subject (the lover) and object (the loved). In the sentence,

rāmaḥ sītāyām prīṇāti – Rāma loves in Sītā

the word Sītā is not in the accusative, but in the locative. This is the interesting thing about the verbal root prī – its object takes the locative case. Why is this? Śrī Jīva Goswami takes this question up in Anuccheda 61.3 of the Prīti Sandarbha and Babaji wrote a commentary on it that is many pages long. Śrī Jīva writes —

tatra prīty-arthānāṁ kriyāṇāṁ viṣayasyādhikaraṇatvam eva dīpty-arthavat, dveṣārthānāṁ tu viṣayasya karmatvaṁ hanty-arthavat |

In the latter regard, the objects of verbs meaning “to love” (prīti) take the locative case (adhikaraṇa), like the objects of verbs meaning “to glow” (dīpti), whereas objects of verbs meaning “to hate” (dveṣa) take the accusative case (karma), like the objects of verbs meaning “to kill” (hanti).

As an aside, although prīti in the sentence above is a noun, it is formed from the verbal root prī by applying the śtip suffix; the resulting noun refers to the verbal root. The more familiar noun prīti, which refers to the noun ‘love’, is differently formed by applying the kti (or ktin in Panini) suffix to the verbal root prī ; the HNV sutra for making this noun is ktir lakṣmyāṁ bhāve.

Śrī Jīva Goswami reasons that verbal roots such as “to exist” or “to shine” do not have an object. The sentence

सूर्यः दीप्यते — the sun shines,

cannot be constructed with a separate object. The act of shining resides in the subject of the action. That is, this sentence can be rewritten as:

सूर्ये दीप्तिः विद्यते — Light inheres in the sun.

Here, we see that the sun acts as the substratum for light, and can be put in the locative case, but there is no way to write an equivalent sentence where the sun is put in the accusative case. All this is another way of saying that the verbal root dīp is an akarmaka verb or a verb devoid of an object, i.e. an intransitive verb. By comparing the verbal root prī with the verbal root dīp, Śrī Jīva Goswami has implied that the verbal root prī is intransitive or akarmaka, even though the viṣaya (object) and āṣraya (subject) of the act of loving are apparently different (unlike the verbal root dīp). Being akarmaka, the object of prī must be in locative case.

How to know whether a verbal root is transitive or intransitive

Śrī Jīva Goswami explains that transitive verbs, or verbs that have a direct object, have a causative sense in them. He first defines karma or object of a verb, then explains the four types of actions that require an object, and finally concludes with what it really means for a verb to have an object. First, the definition of karma:

kartur īpsitatamaṁ khalu karma

[According to Sanskrit grammarians,] the object (karma) of a verb (kriyā) is that which is “most desired” (īpsitatamam) by the agent (kartā).

What does the word īpsitatamaṁ or “most desired” mean? He responds:

īpsitatamatvaṁ ca yā kriyārabhyate, sākṣāt tayaiva sādhayitum iṣṭatamatvam

Here, the term īpsitatamam means “the most directly desired objective to be accomplished by the action being undertaken” (tayaiva sākṣāt sādhayitum).

The four types of objectives are as follows:

sādhanaṁ cotpādyatvena, vikāryatvena, saṁskāryatvena, prāpyatvena ca sampādanam iti catur-vidham | tasmād antar-bhūta-ṇy-artho yo dhātuḥ, sa eva sa-karmakaḥ syāt, nānyaḥ | yathā ghaṭaṁ karotīty

The accomplishment of a desired objective (sādhanam, i.e., sampādanam) is of four types — namely,
by means of production (utpādyatva), transformation (vikāryatva), improvement (saṁskāryatva), and attainment (prāpyatva).

Each of these objectives require some kind of action with the senses. Each of these actions have a causal aspect to them- that is, the agent brings about the accomplishment of one of these objectives. Śrī Jīva Goswami concludes:

tasmād antar-bhūta-ṇy-artho yo dhātuḥ, sa eva sa-karmakaḥ syāt, nānyaḥ

Therefore, only those roots in which a causative meaning is implicit (by application of the ṇi suffix) are considered transitive (sakarmaka), and not others.

He gives an example to make things clear —

yathā ghaṭaṁ karotīty ukte ghaṭa utpadyate tam utpādayatīti gamyate | taṇḍulaṁ pacatīti taṇḍulo viklidyati taṁ vikledayatīty-ādi | sattā-dīpty-ādīnāṁ tu na tādṛśatvaṁ gamyata ity akarmakatvam eveti

As an example [of verbs meaning production], when it is said, “He makes a pot,” it is understood that a pot is being produced (utpadyate) and someone is causing it to be produced (utpādayati). [And as an example of verbs meaning transformation,] when it is said, “He cooks rice,” it means the rice is becoming soft (viklidyati) and someone is causing it to become soft (vikledayati). [The words ity ādi here signify that the same principle applies in regard to verbs meaning improvement and attainment]. Verbal roots such as “to exist” or “to glow” do not convey such an implicit causative sense and are thus intransitive (akarmaka).

How prī (to love) is akarmaka or intransitive

We can now see how the verbal root prī is intransitive. We can simply try to create a sentence using this verbal root in a causative sense, as shown below–

A cook prepares soup — The cook arranges for the soup to be prepared

A devotee loves Śrī Kṛṣṇa — X

Notice that the second sentence cannot be written in a causal sense. These concepts again refute the notion that love is ‘dormant’ in the jīvas. The devotee cannot cause prīti to arise. He or she has no control on it. Prīti manifests on her own in the devotee when she is awarded to the devotee by Bhagavān. Śrī Jīva Goswami explains this in response to the following objection:

the definition of prīti states that it is a type of cognition. Cognition needs a direct object, because we cognize something. Therefore, the act of loving is necessarily sakarmaka.

Śrī Jīva Goswami responds —

na ca prīter jñāna-rūpatvena sakarmakatvam āśaṅkyaṁ, cetati-prabhṛtīnāṁ tad-vinābhāva-darśanāt | ato brahma-jñānavad bhūta-rūpo’yam artho, na ca yajñādi-jñānavad bhavya-rūpo vidhi-sāpekṣa iti siddham |

One should not mistakenly think that prīti, being a type of awareness ( jñāna-rūpatvena), is also transitive, since other roots that signify cognitive acts, such as cetati, “he is conscious or aware,” are not evidenced to be transitive. It is therefore established that prīti [which has been defined above as a particular state of consciousness ( jñāna-viśeṣa)] is priorly existent (bhūta-rūpa), like the immediate intuition of Brahman (brahmajñāna). As such, it is independent of all injunctions and thus not something newly generated (bhavya-rūpa), as is the case for knowledge pertaining to religious ritual acts (yajña).

prīti is not generated- she exists eternally in the hearts of the nitya-siddha devotees. She is awarded to a practitioner at the time of perfection. Babaji raises one more objection —

Here, an argument can be raised from the point of view of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā: “You claim that prīti is not ‘a generated event’ (bhavya-rūpa, i.e., not something ‘producible’ by kriyā, or action) but as already ‘priorly existent’ (bhūta-rūpa). On this basis, you conclude that it is not liable to or dependent on any injunction. However, you accept that prīti is a particular state of consciousness ( jñāna-viśeṣa). But cognition ( jñāna) is a mental action (mānasī kriyā). Therefore, prīti can be an outcome of action in general (kriyā) and dependent on injunctions, just as the attainment of heaven (svarga) is contingent upon the Vedic injunctions.”

He replies —

“The reply to this argument is as follows: It is true that cognition ( jñāna) is a type of action (kriyā), but it is not action (kriyā) in the normal sense of the term. The act of knowing or of being conscious of Bhagavān as the object of love does not occasion any of the four outcomes of action (kriyā) described above. Prīti is not produced, modified, enhanced, or attained by the mental act (kriyā) of knowing ( jñāna). Prīti is independent of all actions of the agent.
It is self-revealing (svayaṁ-prakāśa), meaning that it manifests of its own accord (yadṛcchayā).”

Summary

That the verb prī, to love, is intransitive, indicates that

1. The subject cannot cause it to arise for the object.
2. Love arises of its own accord, and the subject is merely its support or āśraya.
3. The object is not the reason that subjects could use to cause love to arise in themselves
4. Instead, love finds its repose in the object of its own accord

All this implies that love is independent and the lovers play a part in mediating love’s activities.