A major concern of the śāstras is the ascertainment of the paramārtha or supreme object of attainment. There are many attainments possible, and many are mentioned in the śāstras themselves. How does one determine which attainment is the paramārtha? Śrī Jīva Goswami examines this question at length in the Prīti Sandarbha. In Anuccheda 5.9, he establishes criteria for paramārtha as follows. Something is a paramārtha or supreme object of attainment if it has the following qualities:
anāśitva: imperishability
sādhyatva: a valid end
There is a third criterion that is less general. Śrī Jīva Goswami identifies vijñāna or direct experience of the one Absolute Truth as the paramārtha. The paramārtha has a third quality:
sarva-vijñānāntarbhāvavatva: it encompasses the experience of everything else
Śrī Jīva Goswami arrives at this conclusion through an analysis of verses from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, which I take up below. The cited section details a dialogue between Jaḍa Bharata and King Rāhugaṇa.
The difference between śreya and paramārtha
I present English translations of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa section. For the translations, I consulted the great Śrīdhar swami’s commentary. Where no commentary was present, I consulted the Gita press translation available here in Hindi.
I pick up the thread at 2.14.11. The preceding verses and chapter detail how King Rāhugaṇa, unaware of Jaḍa Bharata’s greatness, insults him as he carries his palanquin. Jaḍa Bharata responds to him with words of wisdom that shake King Rāhugaṇa’s pride. He realizes his grave error and seeks forgiveness. Jaḍa Bharata graces King Rāhugaṇa with knowledge at his request, which is as follows (VP 2.14.11):
tan mahyaṁ praṇatāya tvaṁ yac chreyaḥ paramaṁ dvija |
tadvad ākhila-vijñāna-jala-vīcy-udadhir bhavān ||11||
O Dvija! You are the supreme ocean, in whose waters all the [varied] experiences of truth are but waves. Therefore, please speak to me, who bows down to you, the topmost śreya.
Note that the question is about śreya which I deliberately left untranslated, but can be understood as ‘object of attainment’, in contrast with paramārtha or the ‘supreme object of attainment’. Jaḍa Bharata notes this in his reply:
brāhmaṇa uvāca—
bhūpa pṛcchasi kiṁ śreyaḥ paramārthaṁ nu pṛcchasi |
śreyāṁsy aparamārthāni aśeṣāṇi ca bhūpate ||12||
O King! Are you asking me about śreya or about paramārtha? O King, there are many śreyas but there is no paramārtha in any of them.
Examples of śreya
Now he gives examples of śreya in order of increasing value in three verses.
devatārādhanaṁ kṛtvā dhana-sampadam icchati |
putrān icchati rājyaṁ ca śreyas tasyaiva tan nṛpa ||13||
Performing worship of the devas, one who desires wealth, sons and kingdom [sees] that as the topmost śreya.
karma yajñātmakaṁ śreyaḥ phalaṁ svargāpti-lakṣaṇaṁ |
śreyaḥ pradhānaṁ ca phale tad evānabhisaṁhite ||14||
The karma consisting of sacrifice [is itself] the primary śreya when there is no desire for its result. [When its result is desired,] the attainment of heaven is the śreya.
ātmā dhyeyaḥ sadā bhūpa yoga-yuktais tathā param |
śreyas tasyaiva saṁyogaḥ śreyo yaḥ paramātmanaḥ ||15||
Meditation on the ātmā by those established in yoga is the śreya, and the joining of one’s own self with the paramātma is the highest śreya, O king!
śreyāṁsy evam anekāni śataśo’tha sahasraśaḥ |
santy atra paramārthas tu na tv ete śrūyatāṁ ca me ||16||
In this way, there are hundreds and thousands of śreyas, but none of them are the paramārtha. Here about this now.
The reason these are not paramārtha is because they are all perishable attainments, or they are simply means to another end, and not valid goals in themselves (violating one or the other of the two criteria listed at the beginning of this article). This is made clear in the following verses. He first shows how wealth etc. are not paramārtha, because it is not a goal in itself but a means to another end —
dharmāya tyajyate kiṁ nu paramārtho dhanaṁ yadi |
vyayaś ca kriyate kasmāt kāma-prāpty-upalakṣaṇaḥ ||17||
If wealth is the paramārtha, why is it given up for the sake of dharma? Why is it spent for the sake of attaining desired objects?
Wealth is not a valid end, because it is always a means for something else. And it is temporary because it can be spent.
putraś cet paramārthaḥ syāt so’py anyasya nareśvara |
paramārtha-bhūtaḥ so’nyasya paramārtho hi tat-pitā ||18||
O King, if someone’s son is paramārtha, the father (so’py) is also paramārtha (paramārtha-bhūtaḥ) being another’s (anyasya) [son] [who is his father]. And he (so) [his father] is the paramārtha for another (anyasya paramārtho), and his father [is the paramārtha for yet another].
This verse was tricky to translate. Without Śrīdhar swami’s commentary which is also cryptic, it was a lost cause! Five generations are mentioned in the verse! Now we get to the conclusion.
evaṁ na paramārtho’sti jagaty asmin carācare |
paramārtho hi kāryāṇi kāraṇānāṁ aśeṣataḥ ||19||
In this way, there is absolutely no paramārtha in this world of moving and non-moving beings. Otherwise all effects [sons] of causes [fathers] will become paramārtha.
Having a son is not paramārtha because then there are as many attainments possible as the different sons, which puts the validity of such a diffuse goal in doubt.
rājyādi-prāptir atroktā paramārthatayā yadi |
paramārthā bhavanty atra na bhavanti ca vai tataḥ ||20||
If the attainment of kingdom etc are to be called paramārtha, then [because kingdoms come and go] the paramārtha will sometimes be present and at other times, not.
Attainment of a kingdom etc. is not a paramārtha because a kingdom is not stable or imperishable.
Dharma, understood as Vedic rituals or as niṣkāma-karma, are both not the paramārtha
The following verse translations are taken from Babaji’s Priti Sandarbha–
ṛg-yajuḥ-sāma-niṣpādyaṁ yajña-karma mataṁ tava |
paramārtha-bhūtaṁ tatrāpi śrūyatāṁ gadato mama ||21||
O King, if you consider that the sacrificial act (yajña-karma) accomplished according to the Ṛk, Yajur, and Sāma Vedas amounts to the ultimate goal (paramārtha), then listen to what I must say.
yat tu niṣpādyate kāryaṁ mṛdā kāraṇa-bhūtayā |
tat-kāraṇānugamanāj jāyate nṛpa mṛn-mayam ||22||
A thing produced from the raw material of clay will be made of clay because the cause follows into its effect.
evaṁ vināśibhir dravyaiḥ samid-ājya-kuśādibhiḥ |
niṣpādyate kriyā yā tu sā bhavitrī vināśinī ||23||
In the same manner, the ritual act that is accomplished with perishable ingredients, such as wood, ghee, and kuśa grass, will also be perishable.
anāśī paramārthaś ca prājñair abhyupagamyate |
tat tu nāśi na sandeho nāśi-dravyopapāditam ||24||
Those of refined discernment (prājña) accept as the supreme goal only that which is imperishable. Undoubtedly, whatever is accomplished by perishable objects [employed in a yajña] is also perishable.
Ritual sacrifices do not immediately yield svarga as the person who performed the sacrifice continues to live! Instead, they are considered to generate an apūrva, a result that is not visible, which becomes visible upon death (as the attainment of svarga). The problem is that apūrva is perishable, because the ritual acts themselves (such as pouring ghee into the fire, or sprinkling water on rice grains) are composed of perishable acts. As such, svarga or heaven is not a permanent attainment. This is explicitly stated in the Gītā 9.20-9.21.
Now, Śrī Jīva notes that the next verse teaches how niṣkāma-karma yoga is also not paramārtha. He writes:
..Jaḍa Bharata goes on in the following verse to say that even motiveless action (niṣkāma-karma) cannot be the ultimate goal because it is only a means (sādhana) to some other objective (artha-antara) as the ultimate goal (sadhya).
Being a means to another goal, niṣkāma-karma yoga cannot be a paramārtha; it does not satisfy the criterion of being a valid end or an end in itself. The following verse states this explicitly:
tad evāphaladaṁ karma paramārtho matas tava |
mukti-sādhana-bhūtatvāt paramārtho na sādhanam ||25||
If instead you consider motiveless action to be the supreme goal, then because such action is but a means to liberation, it is sādhana alone and not the goal to be attained.
Now, a similar question can be raised about bhakti – that it is composed of perishable acts and it is a means to an end, being a sādhana. How can it be the paramārtha then? Śrī Jīva takes this up in the same discussion, which I will examine next time.
Summary
- Two criteria for determining if an object of attainment is a paramārtha are:
anāśitva: imperishability
sādhyatva: a valid end
2. Dharma, understood as Vedic rituals or as niṣkāma-karma, are both not the paramārtha.
3. Needless to say, objects of desire like wealth, kingdom or children are not the paramārtha.
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